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Abstract
The evolution of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) has so far been
predominantly geared towards defining and refining the abstractions on
the forwarding and control planes. However, despite a maturing south-
bound interface and a range of proposed network operating systems, the
network management application layer is yet to be specified and stan-
dardized. It has currently poorly defined access control mechanisms that
could be exposed to network applications. Available mechanisms allow
only rudimentary control and lack procedures to partition resource access
across multiple dimensions.
We address this by extending the SDN north-bound interface to pro-
vide control over shared resources to key stakeholders of network infras-
tructure: network providers, operators and application developers. We
introduce a taxonomy of SDN access models, describe a comprehensive
design for SDN access control and implement the proposed solution as an
extension of the ONOS network controller intent framework.
1 Introduction
In recent years, research focus on software-defined networking (SDN) shifted
from the maturing forwarding plane abstraction [1, 2] and corresponding south-
bound application programming interfaces (APIs) [3, 4], to richer network con-
trol, management and functionality, as well as initial attempts to define a north-
bound API. However, the field has advanced unevenly. Currently available
north-bound APIs introduce new security risks [5], and the lack of network re-
source access control is one vivid example of this. Security research in SDN has
focused on managing access using topology-specific, low-level resources – such as
switch ports and fine-grained bit-matching of packet flows. While this approach
is valid and necessary, it does not meaningfully address the needs of either net-
work application developers (who create applications operating with network
functionality on a higher level of abstraction) or network operators (who must
consider the security and resource management implications of deploying such
applications). As a result, developers face a choice between two undesirable
alternatives: assume during development that applications have full, exclusive,
and continuous access to deployment resources, or develop custom applications
with in-built awareness of the network topology. However, development perils
do not end there: in either case network applications operate with low-level
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device resources, mostly unfamiliar to system developers. Finally, at deploy-
ment time, operators lack an overview of the resource access granted to network
applications once they have been deployed.
Recent efforts aim to provide a declarative paradigm for implementation -
independent interaction between network service consumers and providers [6].
However, such efforts do not currently include any access control mechanisms
beyond specifying service resource constraints, mostly aimed towards satisfying
Quality-Of-Service network provider policies. Several important prior contribu-
tions to SDN access control [7, 8, 5] do not provide the necessary abstraction
level to allow exposing access control functionality to potentially malicious SDN
applications. We address the above issues by introducing a novel taxonomy of
access models for SDN infrastructure resources and by describing and imple-
menting a North-bound Access Control API (NACA) enforcement mechanism
for SDN deployments.
For developers, NACA brings simple, clear and usable tools to declare re-
source requirements of their network applications.
For operators, the API provides the tools to (1) obtain an overview of the
access to network resources provided to the applications deployed on the SDN
infrastructure and (2) assess the security implications of deploying network ap-
plications, considering the resource access they require. This fills the gap in the
available tools for managing access control to device resources in SDN deploy-
ments and helps answer common questions – such as “Which applications can
read the complete topology of the network?”, or “Which applications can mod-
ify network flows and in which ways?” – that are currently difficult to answer in
a given SDN deployment; (3) limit the extent of application access to network
resources through resource-specific policies.
To implement the API on the control plane1, we build our approach on
best practices from the fields of operating system security and programming
language security – such as code signing for origin verification; code integrity
verification; capability-based access control, use of a reference monitor, etc. –
to enforce access restrictions to SDN infrastructure resources. Furthermore, we
propose leveraging recent developments in execution isolation in order to ensure
the robustness of the deployment in the face of a powerful adversary.
In a nutshell, the proposed approach is as follows. We adopt the common
access control convention and identify two types of entities: subjects – net-
work applications2, often referred to as “Virtual Network Function” (VNFs),
and objects – network resources. NACA access masks are policies that describe
the objects that a certain subject can access, as well as the types of and con-
straints on actions that can be performed on the object attributes. Examples
of types of actions on objects are reading statistics, modifying configuration
state, or subscribing to notifications. Examples of object attributes are geo-
graphical placement of objects, temporal limitations, execution environment
visibility, etc. Resource access requirements declared by a subject are combined
with operator policies to define a distinct immutable access mask that persists
throughout the lifetime of subject instances. Next, we reliably tag requests is-
sued by subjects with their assigned access mask and use a reference monitor to
ensure that access to the network information base is only granted to requests
1In the remainder of this paper, we use the terms forwarding plane, control plane, man-
agement plane, application plane as defined in [9].
2And implicitly their users
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satisfying the constraints of the access mask. In contrast to previous work in
this area, NACA does not depend on the use of a particular south-bound-API.
It operates entirely on the north-bound API and the implementation on the
controller plane. Our contribution is as follows:
• We introduce a taxonomy of access models for network infrastructure re-
sources;
• We introduce a North-bound Access Control API for network infrastruc-
ture operators and application developers;
• We propose a novel access control enforcement mechanism for network
resources in the software-defined networking model;
• We describe an implementation of the proposed API on the control plane;
• We demonstrate the feasibility of the solution through an integration with
an open source SDN controller platform.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce
the system and threat model; next, in Section 3 we describe the north-bound
access control API and its internals, followed in Section 4 by a detailed descrip-
tion of the implementation with the ONOS SDN platform and the evaluation
results in Section 5. We review the related work in Section 6, outline future
work in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
2 System and Threat model
2.1 System model
The software-defined networking model aims to separate the network forwarding
plane – i.e. the collection of network devices responsible for forwarding traffic
– from the control plane – i.e. a collection of functions controlling network
devices, defining the network topology and network connectivity policies [9, 10].
Figure 1 illustrates a high-level architecture of the software-defined networking
model.
The forwarding plane includes hardware and software switches. Early SDN
models envisioned switches that are optimized for forwarding performance, lack
decision logic and only forward packets matching flow definitions – i.e. packet
forwarding rules – in their forwarding information base [11]. Later contribu-
tions delegate more functional responsibility to switches, while maintaining the
capability to selectively upstream packets (or packet data) to controllers [12].
Mismatching packets are discarded or redirected to the control plane through
the south-bound API – a set of vendor-agnostic instructions for communication
between forwarding and control planes; this API is often limited to flow-based
traffic control of the forwarding plane, while management of the forwarding
plane is done through a configuration database [2].
On the control plane, network operator goals are translated into discrete
routing policies based on the global network view, e.g. a graph representation of
the network topology. A core element is the network controller – a logically cen-
tralized component that manages network communication in a deployment by
3
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Figure 1: The SDN architectural model: (1) populate service catalogue; (2) deploy
applications; (3) applications interact with network controller and (4) query the NIB;
(5) Network controller performs configuration actions on forwarding plane.
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Figure 2: SDN infrastructure network resources.
updating the FIB with specific forwarding rules. The network controller com-
piles forwarding rules based on three inputs: the (dynamic) global network view,
the configuration goals of the network operator, and the output of the installed
network applications. The network view built by the controller is maintained
in a network information base (NIB) [13]. This may either include the entire
network topology or a slice of it (e.g. in multi-tenant deployments).
The NIB describes all resources of the SDN deployment reachable by the con-
troller. We use a broad definition of the term resources, to encompass software
components used to achieve network communication goals (e.g. virtual or phys-
ical switches), information about such network components, and interactions
involving them. From a network application point of view, we distinguish three
resource categories: device resources, e.g. forwarding plane components; data
resources, e.g. network topology, flow statistics, forwarding logic; and control
resources, e.g. management policies (Figure 2).
Operators use network management applications to implement network func-
tionality using high-level commands. Network applications – also known as
“middleboxes” – often appear as hardware components in traditional networks;
however, alternatives such as VNFs – e.g. software implementations of firewalls,
traffic shapers, etc. – are better suited for dynamic SDN deployments and hence
are becoming increasingly popular. Applications communicate with the network
controller and are used for network management, based on operator-defined poli-
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cies and network state.
There is currently no single widely adopted interface between applications
and network controllers (i.e. a “north-bound API”). Multiple distinct implementation-
specific interfaces are used by network controllers [14, 15]. We distinguish three
emerging network application deployment models:
1. Locally installed applications, developed in-house or deployed through e.g.
“SDN App Stores” [16].
2. Managed applications, operating in an Software-as-a-Service model, i.e.
on the premises of a network function provider [17, 18].
3. Hybrid applications, where a back-end executing on the application provider
premises interacts with a front-end on the network provider infrastructure.
To facilitate function isolation, scalability and deployment flexibility, applica-
tions are commonly deployed as virtualized components, in e.g. virtual machines
or containers. We define candidate applications as the applications available for
deployment from the service catalogue, which can contain both complete ap-
plication images for locally installed applications or configuration definitions in
the managed applications.
A management and network orchestration (MANO) component monitors the
SDN infrastructure and takes actions to ensure availability and satisfy perfor-
mance requirements. Such actions include component creation, deployment,
migration and destruction. A candidate application becomes an installed appli-
cation once it is granted access to the SDN resources described in the NIB.
We define access by an application to SDN resources as the capability to
execute commands on device resources or modify their state; create, read or
write control resources and data resources. Applications exercise access through
requests submitted to the controller over the north-bound API; the requests are
further compiled into a limited number of queries by the network controller and
submitted to the network information base. A network controller can only issue
queries following a corresponding request by a network application.
Finally, we assume that all communication between network elements is en-
crypted and authenticated. The MANO component provisions all necessary
encryption and authentication credentials to the network elements at deploy-
ment time.
2.2 Threat model
We next describe the threat model (illustrated in Figure 3), along with core
security assumptions on which we base our design. The adversary (Adv) con-
trols the applications installed on the network slice and can request access to
arbitrary device resources. Furthermore, the Adv can collude several applica-
tions to achieve a defined purpose, e.g. take over the device resources allocated
to benign applications (provoking a Denial-of-Service attack on them). It can
intercept, record, forge, drop and replay any message on its network slice and
is only limited by the constraints of the employed cryptographic methods. Fur-
thermore, it can analyze network traffic patterns through passive probing and
may disrupt or degrade network connectivity to achieve its goals. The adversary
can craft malicious packets to exploit vulnerabilities in the request processing
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Figure 3: Adversary capabilities
functionality of the network controller: an adversary may use a network ap-
plication to submit malicious requests to trigger escalation of resource access
permissions for the respective application. However, the Adv can only interact
with the NIB through queries produced by the network controller, based on
requests issued by installed network applications. Briefly, the capabilities of the
adversary are similar to the ones of a malicious application provider or operator,
whose applications are installed on a network slice in a “Network-as-a-Service”
provisioning model.
2.3 Notation and Cryptographic Primitives
The set of all binary strings of length n is denoted by t0, 1un, and the set of all
finite binary strings as t0, 1u˚. Given a set U , we refer to the ith element as ui.
Additionally, we use the following notations for cryptographic operations:
• For an arbitrary message m P t0, 1u˚, we denote by c “ Enc pK,mq a
symmetric encryption of m using the secret key K P t0, 1u˚. The corre-
sponding symmetric decryption operation is denoted by m “ DecpK, cq “
DecpK,EncpK,mqq.
• We denote by pk{sk a public/private key pair for a public key encryption
scheme. Encryption of message m under the public key pk is denoted
by c “ Encpk pmq3 and the corresponding decryption operation by m “
Decskpcq “ DecskpEncpkpmqq.
• A digital signature over a message m is denoted by σ “ Signskpmq. The
corresponding verification operation for a digital signature is denoted by
b “ Verifypkpm,σq, where b “ 1 if the signature is valid and b “ 0 other-
wise.
3Alternative notation used for clarity is tmupk.
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• A Message Authentication Code (MAC) using a secret key K over a mes-
sage m is denoted by µ “ MACpK,mq.
3 Taking Control Over Network Resources
Decoupling abstraction layers is a core benefit of the SDN model. It allows
to combine solutions from distinct providers across the abstraction layers of a
network infrastructure while maintaining encapsulation. This also applies to
the interface between the application layer and the rest of the SDN deployment:
on the one hand, application developers are often oblivious to packet switch-
ing details and network functionality internals. On the other hand, operators
may want to withhold details of their SDN deployments from potentially mali-
cious applications and only allow them to interact with the SDN infrastructure
through a restricted policy interface.
3.1 Access Classification Scheme
Network applications require a variety of network resources to fulfill their func-
tional requirements. In some cases, they may require temporary exclusive ac-
cess, e.g. for atomic updates to the NIB [19]. However, they seldom – if ever –
require complete and indefinite access to all resources. Furthermore, operators
may wish to limit the access of applications to SDN resources. For example,
a passive network intrusion detection function may only need “read” access to
device resources, control resources and data resources, but it need not be able
to modify the network state; in addition, the network operator may intend to
limit the access of the intrusion-detection application to traffic from endpoints
located in a certain jurisdiction. Similar to other domains where multiple parties
access distributed resources (e.g. radio spectrum access [20]), we foresee multi-
ple models of managing access to SDN resources. Based on an extensive review
of existing literature on software-defined networking [21, 13, 11, 22, 19], as well
as earlier classifications of access to resources in distributed systems [20, 23], we
next propose a taxonomy of SDN resource access models (see Figure 4). While
this scheme covers the access models and use cases identified in the reviewed
literature, it can be extended with novel and emerging access models in the
future.
Direct
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Figure 4: Taxonomy of SDN resource access models.
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3.1.1 Direct Explicit Assignment
In this model, the operator explicitly prescribes the SDN resources each applica-
tion can access, the actions that can be performed on the resources, the duration
of the granted access and other (potentially resource-specific) attributes. This
approach is suitable in cases when applications must have guaranteed access to
certain resources or vice-versa, when particularly limited or security-sensitive
SDN resources must be explicitly assigned to certain applications to be accessi-
ble. Direct explicit assignment might not be applicable to either all applications
or SDN resources in the deployment. The direct assignment model is the most
restrictive in the proposed taxonomy.
3.1.2 Exclusive Unlimited Access
In this model, the operator allows the application exclusive, unlimited access to
listed SDN resources under defined constraints – e.g. geographical placement,
jurisdiction, duration, etc; it encompasses two variants:
• Long-term exclusive unlimited access: an installed application A
has unfettered access to SDN resources until its termination and cannot
delegate its access permissions to a different application;
• Dynamic exclusive access: the installed application A has unfettered
access to SDN resources. However it can delegate its permissions to other
installed applications (e.g. B and C ). All permissions for applications A,
B, C are revoked once application A is terminated.
3.1.3 Shared Access
In this model, the access to SDN resources allocated to an installed application
A is shared with one or more installed applications (e.g. B and C ). This model
is further detailed into the following two variants:
• Priority policy: in this case, if applications B and C may attempt to
access the SDN resources allocated to A, their requests will always be
denied in case of a conflicting request from A.
• Dynamic negotiation: application A may issue requests with varying
priorities when prompted by other installed applications B and C. In this
case, higher-priority requests from applications B and C would be ac-
cepted. Implementation of this variant may involve intricate details on
dynamic access negotiation between applications.
3.1.4 Commons
The network operator may apply this least restrictive model to applications
which require access to the same pool of SDN resources and have the same
trust level. This model contains three variants:
• Uncontrolled commons: installed applications compete unrestricted
for access to the allocated SDN resources. Conflict resolution mechanisms
(as proposed in [24, 5]) can be used to prioritize conflicting requests. Lack
of effective conflict resolution can impair the functionality of this variant.
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• Managed commons: installed applications compete for access to the
allocated SDN resources; in case of request conflicts, applications nego-
tiate access using peer-to-peer protocols. Compared to the uncontrolled
commons variant, this reduces the conflict resolution overhead, at the cost
of increased communication between installed applications.
• Private commons: this variant includes elements of the dynamic exclu-
sive access variant described above. Installed application A with exclusive
unlimited access to a set of SDN resources (and delegation permissions)
may allow access for other applications using one of the commons variants
described above.
Once one or more SDN resource access models have been selected, the re-
source access control is expressed through policies, as described below.
3.2 Policies for infrastructure management
Kephart et al [25] describe three types of infrastructure management policies:
goal policies, utility function policies and action policies. Goal policies and
utility function policies are most suitable to specify enterprise business objec-
tives and Service Level Agreements. In a datacenter scenario, a goal policy
example may be “Response time of Gold Class should be less than 100ms”,
while a utility function policy can be “Maximize the sum of Gold and Sil-
ver Classes”. In practice, such high-level commands are transformed into ac-
tion policies, often in the form of ‘IF (Condition) THEN (Action)’, e.g. ‘IF
(Gold Class.Response Time > 100 ms) THEN (increase CPU by 5%)’. Con-
sidering the widely adopted SDN south-bound API protocols, it is clear that
they are unsuitable for expressing goal policies or utility function policies; it is
equally clear that formulating action policies requires intimate knowledge of the
SDN deployment. Instead, functional details of SDN deployments can be encap-
sulated and selectively exposed to network applications through a north-bound
interface (NBI).
The north-bound interface intent framework (Intent NBI) [6] proposed by
the Open Networking Foundation and implemented in the ONOS intent frame-
work [14], adopts this approach. Intent NBI aims to separate consumer and
provider system implementations and simplify consumer-originated requests to
provider systems. This is realized through non-prescriptive and composable
requests, independent of network operator implementations and internal poli-
cies [6]. The non-prescriptive property allows the network controller the greatest
degrees of freedom in fulfilling service requests and thus facilitates conflict res-
olution, since intent requests do not specify which resources providers must
allocate to specific services. Implementation independence is supported by a
mapping mechanism, to provide the bridge between application and controller
frame-of-reference terms. Figure 5 presents a high-level view of the intent NBI
approach to translating the policies – expressed in consumer application terms
– to configurations – expressed in network controller terms.
The intent NBI currently lacks a mechanism to encapsulate the details of
access control over network resources, in order to shield them from installed
network applications. We extend the Intent NBI with a north-bound access
control API (NACA) that exposes such higher-level abstractions to applications
9
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Figure 5: Intent NBI high-level architecture illustrating the mechanism of frame-of-
reference term mapping for intents.
and implements them on the control plane. NACA allows to both produce policy-
defined network slices and complement the intent framework with additional
attributes, such as physical resource visibility, execution environment access,
concurrency, etc. It is flexible enough to accommodate the various access models
of the taxonomy introduced in §3.1.
We introduce NACA by first describing its concepts and underlying mech-
anisms. We next delve into the underlying implementation by describing: the
north-bound access control API, which extends the Intent NBI introduced above
and allows applications to declare the network resources and type of access nec-
essary for their functionality; a mechanism to reliably tag application requests
with their respective access mask; finally, a reference monitor, which ensures
that illegal queries issued by applications are detected and discarded even in
the event of a network controller compromise.
3.3 Scalable Access Control for SDN Resources
Beyond managing access to network resources, the centralized NIB introduced
in the SDN model allows to limit access to resources using partial views of
the system according to various dimensions, such as geographical or logical
placement of resources, visibility of the underlying execution platform, etc.
This approach differs from both network slicing and from network virtual-
ization. In [26, 21], FlowVisor defines slices along any combination of ten packet
header fields, including physical, link, network, and transport layers; further-
more, such slices can be defined with negation (all packets but TCP packets with
dst port 80), unions (ethertype is ARP or IP dst address is 255.255.255.255),
or intersections (netblock 192.168/16 and IP protocol is TCP). Network virtu-
alization decouples virtual topologies from the physical infrastructure, without
exposing the mappings; instead, tenants only see their virtual networks [27].
However, neither slicing nor network virtualization can support the rich variety
of access models introduced in §3.1.
We propose dividing the flowspace, on the north-bound API level, according
to: (1) the resource access requests of the subjects and (2) access masks, defined
– per subject – by the MANO component. Subjects (i.e. the installed appli-
cations) declare the resource access requests in a deployment manifest (§3.4.1).
Access masks describe limitations to resource access on a higher abstraction
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level and can depend on the attributes of the network resources themselves,
of the environment where they execute, or on the state of the SDN deploy-
ment (§3.4.2). Finally, limitations described by the access masks are enforced
by NACA on the controller platform (§3.4.3).
This approach – first outlined in [28] – is based on a combination of earlier in-
troduced access control approaches, such as capability-based access (CBA) [29,
30], attribute-based access control (ABAC) [31] and policy-based access control
(PBAC) [32]. CBA is a subject-oriented approach, where a capability represents
an unforgeable token used to access a resource. Subjects store their capabilities
as sets of pairs (xi, tRu), where x represents a resource and tRu represents
the set of access rights to the resource granted to the subject. PBAC allows
flexible management of access rules using policies – expressed as sets of rules
combined to decide authorization and determine authorization level – and can
be seen as a standardization of ABAC for governance-oriented structures [33].
Restricting user access to resources using an access control API has been in-
troduced earlier [34, 7], as well as limiting access to data based on higher-level
attributes (e.g. based on geographical location [35]). However, to the best of our
knowledge there is currently no support for access control based on higher-level
attributes for SDN controllers.
We describe the framework allowing attributes to be used as input for access
masks that limit access to network resources. We do not aim to provide an
exhaustive list of resource attributes that can serve as input for access masks,
since attributes are resource- and implementation-specific. The rationale behind
the proposed approach is based on the portability, performance, elasticity and
(multiple) security requirements formulated for VNFs [36]. We start by defining
a resource attribute in the context of NACA:
A resource attribute is a property of the SDN resource that can be used to
describe access constraints on the respective resource. The values of a collection
of resource attributes can determine the type and scope of access to an SDN
resource granted to a subject.
Table 1 outlines several examples of attributes (beyond trivial ones such as
e.g. instance name or identifier). Recall the example introduced by Kephart [25]
and described above. The network resource attributes presented in Table 1 can
be used to create access restrictions on the goal policy level, without specifying
details about either the deployment itself or the various protocols that it uses
for internal communication among the components.
Table 1: Example attributes and clarifications
Placement Geogr./logical placement of accessible resources
Scope Aggregate vs domain-specific access
Time Continuous updates vs discrete updates
Jurisdiction Jurisdictional placement of accessible resources
Physical resource visibility Visibility of underlying execution environment
Execution environment access Direct vs mediated access to physical resources
Resource modification types Read state vs modify state
Concurrency Exclusive (locking) or non-exclusive access
Authority delegation Ability to delegate access capabilities
In a typical workflow, network operators define for each available resource
11
R (and based on its attributes) a set of resource access rules (1).
Ri “ trar1i , ..., rarni u; Rj “ trar1j , ..., rarnj u; ...; Rm “ trar1m, ..., rarnmu (1)
The resource access rules contain values for the relevant attributes (e.g. as in
Table 1) of each resource.
A candidate application declares through an application deployment manifest
the network resources it requires for its functionality. Besides a structured
enumeration of the required resources, the manifest optionally contains the types
of actions to be performed. The set of requested resources must be a subset of
available resources advertised by the network controller (2).
tri, rj , ..., rmu P AvailableResources (2)
The resource enumeration in the deployment manifest (DM) consists of a list
of tuples, where each tuple contains a requested resource and a set of actions
on the resource that the application requires for its functionality. This has the
form xresource, actionsy, as shown in (4):
DM “ txri, ta1, a2, ..., anuy, xrj , ta1, a2, ..., anuy, ..., xrm, ta1, a2, ..., anuyu (3)
The actions listed in the deployment manifest (3) are resource and implementa-
tion specific: Ferguson et al. describe two types of actions – read and write [24];
Klaedtke et al. propose an expanded action set, including permissions for read-
ing statistics (stat), requesting information about an object (config read),
modifying the state of an object (config mod), as well as for subscription per-
missions (subscr) [5]. Investigation of a comprehensive taxonomy of actions
applicable to SDN resources is out of the scope of this paper and left for future
work.
The MANO component computes the access mask. First, it selects the
resource access rules applicable to the requested resources and relevant to the
application and builds an operator policy set (4):
OP “ txrar1i , ..., rarni y, xrar1j , ..., rarnj y, ..., xrar1m, ..., rarnmyu (4)
Next, it applies a function fAM to map each element in the operator policy set
OP to at most one element in DM (5). Note that depending on the number
and scope of the resource access rules, fAM is either a surjective, bijective or
injective mapping of resource access rules to requested resources.
fAM : OP ÝÑ DM (5)
The resulting access mask AM is a three element tuple of the form xresource,
actions, resourceAccessRulesy (6). Note that there is no requirement that
resource access rules describe all possible attributes of a resource.
AM “ txri, ta1, ..., anu, trar1i , ..., rarni uy, ..., xrm, ta1...anu, trar1m, ..., rarnmuyu
(6)
The MANO component maintains a dictionary of installed applications and their
resource masks. For each new installed application, conflict detection is done by
recursively checking matching resources, matching resource access rules and fi-
nally matching resource attribute values. Applications with conflicting resource
12
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requests can only be installed once the conflict is resolved. This approach to
specifying access masks allows to implement any of the resource access models
described in the taxonomy introduced in §3.1.
The resulting access mask is communicated to the Request Tagger, which
– in combination with the Reference Monitor – ensures that the respective
application cannot access resources outside the access mask, as described below.
3.4 NACA Internals
To implement support for capability-based access control policies in NACA, we
have applied the Policy Core Information Model (PCIM) IETF specification [37],
which describes an object-oriented information model for representing policy in-
formation. The architecture of NACA is aligned with the PCIM approach. The
flow of intents issued by installed applications is illustrated in Figure 6. The
depicted components can be directly mapped to the elements of the SDN ar-
chitectural model (see Figure 1), with the exception of Request Tagger (RT)
and Reference Monitor (RM), both introduced as supporting mechanisms for
NACA. Figure 6 also depicts the trust relationship between the included com-
ponents, according to the threat model in §2.2: the MANO component, Request
Tagger, Reference Monitor and the NIB are considered to be trusted, while the
application(s) and network controller are untrusted.
In a vanilla approach, application intents are forwarded to the network con-
troller which maps them to its internal frame of reference (recall Figure 5),
compiles them to a set of configuration instructions and applies the instruc-
tions on the network information base. We next motivate the introduction of
additional components and describe their functionality.
3.4.1 North-bound Access Control API
Network applications vary significantly in their intended functionality. While
software development best-practices emphasize data and function encapsula-
tion [38], application developers cannot be expected to either develop applica-
tions that efficiently use limited SDN resources or have an understanding of
resource partitioning within any particular SDN deployment. On the other
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hand, it is reasonable to expect that application developers are interested in ex-
plicitly specifying the complete set of sufficient resources for correct application
functionality. This may include elements of all resource categories introduced
in §2.1 – device, control, and data resources.
A network operator uses the deployment manifest (among other parameters)
to decide whether a certain application should be installed or included in the
application service catalog. Listing 1 shows an example deployment manifest in
a notation based on the standardized OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) Version 3.0 [39] (pruned for clarity and brevity).
Listing 1: Deployment manifest
fragment
1 <AnyOf>
2 <AllOf>
3 <Match MatchId=” st r ing´equal ”>
4 <AttributeValue>dataplane
topology</AttributeValue>
5 <AttributeDesignator
Attr ibute Id = ” resource
´id ” Category=” re source
”/>
6 </Match>
7 </AllOf>
8 </AnyOf>
9 <AnyOf>
10 <AllOf>
11 <Match MatchId=” st r ing´equal ”>
12 <AttributeValue>read</
AttributeValue>
13 <AttributeDesignator
Attr ibute Id = ” act ion´
id ” Category=” act ion ”/>
14 </Match>
15 </AllOf>
16 <AllOf>
17 <Match MatchId=” st r ing´equal ”>
18 <AttributeValue>modify</
AttributeValue>
19 <AttributeDesignator
Attr ibute Id = ” act ion´id
” Category=” act ion ”/>
20 </Match>
21 </AllOf>
22 </AnyOf>
Listing 2: Resource mask fragment based
on deployment manifest
1 <AnyOf>
2 <AllOf>
3 <Match MatchId=” st r ing´equal ”>
4 <AttributeValue> dataplane topology
</AttributeValue>
5 <AttributeDesignator Attr ibute Id=
” resource´id ” Category=”
re source ”></
AttributeDesignator>
6 </Match>
7 <Match MatchId=” st r ing´equal ”>
8 <AttributeValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>
region A´</AttributeValue>
9 <AttributeDesignator Attr ibute Id=
” j u r i s d i c t i o n ” Category=”
re source ”></
AttributeDesignator>
10 </Match>
11 <Match MatchId=” st r ing´equal ”>
12 <AttributeValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>
dataplane topology</
AttributeValue>
13 <AttributeDesignator Attr ibute Id=
” resource´id ” Category=”
re source ”></
AttributeDesignator>
14 </Match>
15 </AllOf>
16 </AnyOf>
17 <AnyOf>
18 <AllOf>
19 <Match MatchId=” st r ing´equal ”>
20 <AttributeValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>
read</AttributeValue>
21 <AttributeDesignator
Attr ibute Id=”
act ion´id ”
Category=” act ion ”
>
22 </AttributeDesignator>
23 </Match>
24 </AllOf>
25 </AnyOf>
Once installed, an application containing in its deployment manifest the frag-
ment from Listing 1 can read and modify the topology on the data plane. While
the application requires read permissions to the network topology, revealing the
entire topology might be unacceptable to the network operator. Instead, the
operator may consider allowing the application to access only a restricted subset
of the topology and present the rest as a black box. Therefore, the operator uses
the MANO component to apply a simple resource access rule to the resource
“dataplane-topology”. The rule comprises only one attribute – jurisdiction –
with the value “region-A”. Once applied, the resource access rule reduces the
visibility of the topology for the application exclusively to the selected region,
while the rest of the topology is not reported.
To represent access masks, we extend the OASIS XACML notation [39]
(see Listing 2). The resource mask example in Listing 2 allows an application
to access the topology of the SDN deployment; however, it is only limited to
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the resources located in region “A”. The MANO component communicates the
access masks for each installed application to the Request Tagger.
3.4.2 Request tagging
Application requests must be authenticated and tagged with an access mask prior
to reaching the network controller. While such functionality can be implemented
by the network controller, we have chosen a modular approach for the follow-
ing reasons: first, authentication and tagging are generic functions that can
be implemented independently from a deployment-specific network controller;
second, this approach allows to minimize the network controller modifications,
required to implement NACA; finally, the network controller is a high-value,
high-risk target which may contain API vulnerabilities which can be exploited
by untrusted applications; moreover, query parsing is a common attack vec-
tor [40] which could be used to corrupt the network controller. The reasons
above motivate the introduction of a Request Tagger – a pre-processing com-
ponent implementing access control on the north-bound interface, resilient to a
potentially compromised network controller (Figure 6).
At deployment time, the MANO component communicates to the Request
Tagger a set of tuples describing the installed applications and their access mask;
the set of tuples is updated for every new installed application. We consider the
Request Tagger a trusted component (see discussion in §4.2) and assume the
integrity of such messages can be ensured and reliably verified. Application re-
quests on the north-bound interface must contain a reliably verified application
identifier, the set of requested resources (i.e. elements included in the applica-
tion deployment manifest), and an intent that can be compiled into one or more
implementable queries to the NIB. An incoming request is pre-processed by the
Request Tagger, which:
1. verifies the authenticity of the request;
2. matches the application instance – identified by (Appi) – with one of the
access masks (AMi) earlier communicated by the MANO component;
3. assigns a unique identifier to the request (Reqji);
4. tags the request with the identified access mask.
For step 4, the Request Tagger constructs a tag (7) which is a MAC over the fol-
lowing elements: identifier of the requesting application (Appi); unique identity
of the request (Reqji); application access mask AMi; monotonically increasing
sequence counter n. The MAC value is computed using a shared key K dis-
tributed by the MANO component at deployment time to the Request Tagger
and Reference Monitor (see Figure 7).
µ “ MACpK, pAppi,Reqji,AMi, nqq (7)
Next, the application request is forwarded to the network controller without
further processing, along with AMi – the application access mask. The network
controller processes the request, applies operator-defined policies and compiles
a request Reqji into a set of discrete queries tQj1i ..Qjni u. Note that the compiled
queries contain the identifier of the requesting application (Appi) and the unique
request identifier (Reqji). Internals of network controller processing are out of
the scope of this description and can be found in [41, 14].
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1.AMi
2.Appi
3.AM
4.Reqji
5.n,Appi,AMi, µ
6.Reqji,Appi,AMi
7.tQj1i ..Qjni u
8.
Figure 7: Message flow in NACA (we assume communication over a secure channel).
Components: MANO: management and orchestration component; RT: request tagger;
NC: network controller; RM: reference monitor; NIB: network information base. Flow :
(1) MANO computes access mask and (2) deploys the app; (3) MANO distributes to
Request Tagger the access mask for Appi; once the application Appi issues a request (4),
RT computes a tag and communicates it to the RM (5), prior to forwarding the request
to the NC where the request is processed and compiled into a set of queries (6), for-
warded to the RM (7). RM verifies the queries, computes a MAC over each query with
a nonce – producing ttQj1i , u1, µj1i u..tQjni , un, µjni uu and forwards them to the NIB (8).
3.4.3 Access Reference Monitor
The queries produced by the network controller describe discrete changes made
to e.g. the configuration of network elements or flow tables on the forwarding
plane. However, a network controller containing API vulnerabilities, imple-
mentation bugs or maliciously modified through an attack [42] may produce
queries that invoke resources outside of the application’s access mask. To ad-
dress this, we introduce a Reference Monitor as a discrete component (similar
to the approach described in §3.4.2). It validates the network controller output
(i.e. queries ready for execution on the NIB) and ensures that illegal application
queries fail to reach the NIB. Illegal application queries are those that on behalf
of an application invoke resources outside of its access mask.
The workflow of the Reference Monitor is as follows. At deployment time,
the MANO component pre-seeds the Reference Monitor with the key material
(e.g. public key infrastructure certificate) required to establish an authenti-
cated, confidentiality and integrity-protected communication channel, as well
as a shared key K used for authenticating incoming request tags. This commu-
nication channel is maintained throughout the component lifetime. In-transit
component protection can be ensured using mechanisms described in [43].
Request matching For each application request, the Request Tagger com-
municates to the Reference Monitor, over a secure channel, the tag µ computed
according to (7), along with the application identifier (Appi), its current access
mask (AMi) and a request counter n. Similarly, the network controller forwards
to the Reference Monitor for verification all queries, produced from application
requests according to the respective access mask.
Upon receiving a set of queries from the network controller, the Reference
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Monitor first verifies the freshness of the monotonically increasing counter n (it
is expected that a correctly functioning network controller compiles requests in
first-in-first-out order). It next computes a tag µ1 according to operation (7)
and compares the result with the received tag µ; execution only continues if
µ1 “ µ. Finally, it parses the queries and verifies them against the access mask
of the application. This is done by checking that:
• queries exclusively invoke resources enumerated in the access mask;
• resources are invoked according to the actions specified in the access mask.
Query invalidation While duration of request compilation into queries can
vary depending on the complexity of the requests, a malicious network controller
may delay or reorder output of queries. To prevent the reuse of a more per-
missive access mask for lower-privileged applications, we use a sliding window
for invalidating the computed queries. The approach is as follows: a delayed
request Req1a issued by application Appa can be followed by a limited number
of requests Req2a...Req
n
a issued by the same application, while a delay of Req
n`1
a
requests from the same application invalidates the entire batch (the limit is
configuration-specific); delay of a request Req1a issued by Appa followed by a re-
quest Req1b issued by Appb, as well as reordering of the requests issued by Appa
and Appb, invalidates both requests.
The verification by the Reference Monitor adds an essential element of the
direct explicit assignment resource access model introduced in §3.1: access is
only permitted to SDN resources that have been explicitly described and over
actions that have been explicitly listed. We exemplify this below.
Recall the access mask fragment in Listing 2. Example 3.1 shows a query
to install a new flow between source IP w, port w1 and destination IP x, port
x1 over the user datagram protocol. The Reference Monitor would trivially
reject this query since it invokes a resource (flow) that is not enumerated in the
deployment manifest (and hence would not be present in the access mask).
Example 3.1. New flow installation query
xflow, allow, srcIP “ w, dstIP “ x proto “ UDP, srcPort “ w1, dstPort “ x1y
Depending on the size and complexity of the query set, verifying queries may
require multiple interactions between the Reference Monitor and NIB to learn
the attributes of the invoked resources. In Example 3.2 the application requests
a list of logical termination points that bound a node ‘j’:
Example 3.2. Application request
xtopo, nodej, ltpRefListy
To verify this query, the Reference Monitor must first obtain the topology
reference of the respective node (nodej), identify its jurisdiction and compare
it with the jurisdiction in the access mask (region-A in Listing 2). If nodej
is located in region-A, a list of logical termination points (also located in the
same jurisdiction) is returned to the caller. Otherwise the request is denied.
In case of an access mask mismatch – which may indicate an intent compiler
bug or a compromise of the network controller – the Reference Monitor drops
the illegal query and notifies the MANO component to take an appropriate
mitigation action. While the access mask verification prevents illegal queries,
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a compromised network controller may attempt other attacks as well, such as
attempt to circumvent the Reference Monitor by compiling a request into a
set of unintended queries (which nevertheless comply with the access mask).
Considering that a vulnerability in the network controller must be exploited
(or triggered) through a request from a malicious application, such an attack
is prevented by the sliding window invalidating delayed or reordered queries.
This prevents the adversary from inserting malicious queries into the set of
queries compiled from the request of a benign application. The ordering, origin
and privileges of submitted requests – communicated from the Request Tagger
to the Request Manager – provide the information necessary for invalidating
queries in case of suspected network controller compromise. Note however that
these steps help prevent exploitation of a compromise and do not aim to detect
all occurrences of compilation errors. Likewise, the steps above do not prevent
malicious actions by code built into the intent compiler. This problem (first
formulated in [44]) is out of the current scope.
For valid requests, the Reference Monitor computes a MAC over each query
and a nonce ‘u’ using the key KNIB, shared between Reference Monitor and NIB
(8).
tµj1i ..µjni u “ MACpKNIB, pQj1i , u1qq..MACpKNIB, pQjni , unqq (8)
Finally, the Reference Monitor forwards the queries, nonces and computed
MACs to the NIB, which first recomputes the MACs and only processes queries
with verified integrity and a fresh nonce.
4 Implementation
We have implemented NACA as an extension to ONOS, a popular open-source
SDN controller [41]. ONOS includes an intent framework, allowing applications
to specify their network control desires as policies rather than specific mech-
anisms [14]. This raises the abstraction level for applications from specifying
details about how the SDN infrastructure configuration should be updated to
achieve certain functional changes (e.g. by updating network flows, instantiating
new applications, etc.) to conveying through high-level intents what function-
ality should be enabled. This shift is equivalent to replacing the need to specify
network mechanisms acting through OpenFlow operations with tools that are
more durable and robust in the face of topology changes. Once created by
an application, intents become immutable objects communicated to the ONOS
core which – when installed – alter the network state.
4.1 Extending the ONOS Intent Framework
In ONOS, intent objects contain the identifier of the issuing application
(ApplicationId) and are uniquely identifiable through the intent identifier
(IntentId), generated when the query object is created in the intent frame-
work based on an application request. An ONOS intent is additionally de-
scribed by the following elements: the required device resources (a collection of
networkResource objects, similar to the the NACA queries described above);
the intent priority and constraints prescribed by the application (criteria
enumerating e.g. packet header fields or patterns describing slices of traffic);
instructions describing actions to be applied to a slice of traffic. To implement
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Figure 8: NACA Extended intent framework state diagram. Transitions: (1) ap-
plication request; (2) tagged query request; (3) submit for compilation; (4) compile
succeeded; (5) install succeeded; (6) verify access compliance; (7) withdrawal installed
request; (8) remove topo or flow event; (9) add/update topo event; (10) compile failed;
(11) retry compile; (12) install failed; (13) retry install; (14) compile failed or same
result; (15) withdrawal of failed requests; (16) reference monitor rejected request; (17)
retry install intent.
NACA, we extend the intent framework with two components – RequestTagger
and ReferenceMonitor. Figure 8 depicts the state transition diagram for com-
pilation of application intents [14], along with the NACA extensions.
The RequestTagger pre-processes intents submitted by applications. It first
reliably determines the identity of the issuing application by checking the in-
tent signature and certificate, and assigns a corresponding ApplicationId. It
next identifies the access mask matching the ApplicationId, computes the tag
T (see 9), communicates it to the Reference Monitor and transitions to the
InstallRequest state (transition 2 in Figure 8).
T “ MACpK, pApplicationId, IntentIdnetworkResource, priority, AM, nqq (9)
In ONOS, we implemented the RequestTagger as a state of the intent frame-
work, invoked directly from the IntentManager class. The intent framework
compiles requests issued by the applications into queries according to constraints
specified in the access mask. Prior to executing the compiled query on the NIB
and transitioning to the Installed state, the execution flow transitions to the
ReferenceMonitor (transition 5 in Figure 8). The ReferenceMonitor first
verifies tag T by recomputing the MAC:
MACpK, pApplicationId, IntentIdnetworkResource, priority, AM, nqq (10)
It next verifies that the queries fall into the validation sliding window, by check-
ing that all earlier expected queries have been output (sliding window for delayed
requests was configured to n=2) and that queries have the expected source appli-
cation and access mask. Finally, it checks that the compiled queries do not vio-
late the access mask assigned by the MANO component, as described in §3.4.3:
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the ReferenceMonitor parses the query to check if all invoked resources are in-
cluded in the access mask, if queries follow the limits of the resource attributes,
as well as whether the queries invoke only actions allowed by the access mask.
A MAC is computed over valid queries and submitted – along with the requests
– to the NIB.
Similar to the RequestTagger above, the ReferenceMonitor is implemented
as a state of the ONOS intent framework. Every intent must transition to the
ReferenceMonitor state before the resulting compiled queries can be applied.
Queries submitted directly to the NIB are ignored, as they lack a valid MAC
that must be computed by the ReferenceMonitor.
The Constraint implementation in ONOS allows applications to formulate
filters which are applied on the submitted intents. We leverage this imple-
mentation to apply the access masks assigned by the MANO component – the
ReferenceMonitor ensures that the candidate intents comply with the access
mask constraints. If an access mask violation is detected, the ReferenceMonitor
transitions to the Failed state (transition 16 in Figure 8).
4.2 Component Isolation
Request Tagger and Reference Monitor are of central importance in verifying
access of untrusted applications to limited, potentially confidentiality and in-
tegrity sensitive resources. To protect them from a malicious network con-
troller, the Request Tagger and Reference Monitor are executed in a trusted
execution environment isolated from a potentially malicious underlying oper-
ating system [45, 43, 46]. We adopt the definition of trust from [47], namely
“confidence in the integrity of an entity for reliance on that entity to fulfill spe-
cific responsibilities”. A trusted execution environment can be created using
operating system level virtualization [48], platform virtualization [49], or using
hardware-assisted isolated execution environments [50] – such as ARM Trust-
Zone [51], Intel SGX enclaves [52] or AMD secure memory encryption [53].
The exact implementation approach depends of multiple factors, such as threat
model, deployment context, acceptable performance penalty or hardware capa-
bilities. In the current implementation, as further described in Section 5, we
have chosen operating system level virtualization to separate the trusted com-
ponents – such as RequestTagger, ReferenceMonitor and the NIB – from the
vulnerable network controller. This approach allows to isolate the process and
address spaces of the components, while avoiding excessive overhead.
5 Evaluation
We next evaluate the security (§5.1) and performance (§5.2) of NACA.
5.1 Security Evaluation
To evaluate the security of NACA, we review the attack vectors available to
the adversary, considering the the system model defined in §2.1 and the threat
model defined in §2.2. In the context of NACA, the following attack vectors
available to an adversary:
• Vector 1 - attacks using arbitrary requests of network resources;
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• Vector 2 - packet tampering;
• Vector 3 - disrupt or degrade network connectivity;
• Vector 4 - trigger software vulnerabilities with malformed or crafted pack-
ets.
Vector 1 The adversary may attempt to submit to the network controller ar-
bitrary resource requests in order to exploit access control vulnerabilities and ob-
tain unauthorized access to network resources. This is one of the attack vectors
that NACA aims to protect against. First, by allowing only whitelisted resource
requests (filtered using the request mask) and discarding all other requests, the
request tagger throttles the number of requests that reach the network con-
troller. Second, the request mask is defined by the network administrator at
the time of enrolling the network application into the deployment; this allows
to set a restrictive access mask on unverified or untrusted) network applications
to prevent abuse.
Vector 2 The adversary may attempt to tamper with the packets exchanged
on the management network between the network elements in the SDN infras-
tructure. This class of attacks in SDN infrastructure has been earlier described
in [54]. Authenticating and encrypting the communication occurring on the
management network between the network elements is (as per the assumption
in §2.1) prevents such attacks.
Vector 3 The adversary may attempt to cause a Denial-of-Service (DoS) at-
tack on the SDN infrastructure by disrupting or degrading network connectivity.
In the case of an adversary that can drop arbitrary packets on the management
network NACA does not prevent such attacks. The situation is different in
the case when the adversary cannot drop arbitrary packets on the network and
launches attacks on the SDN infrastructure through queries issued from network
applications. In this case NACA limits the capability to launch a DoS attack
by restricting the set of available network resource requests with the resource
mask. described in §3.3.
Vector 4 Given full access to the north-bound API, the adversary is able to
send maliciously crafted packets to trigger vulnerabilities in the packet process-
ing code of network elements, as shown in [55]. As suggested in [56], this attack
can be contained by running the potentially vulnerable component in an isolated
execution environment that ensures code integrity, such as SGX enclaves (see
4.2. While this does not exclude code vulnerabilities and hence does not prevent
the attack per se, isolated execution and code integrity monitoring prevents the
adversary from exploiting the attack and gaining control of additional assets.
Considering the above analysis of the identified attack vectors, an adversary
is only left with the ability to conduct DoS attacks on the SDN infrastructure,
limited to the situation when the adversary can drop arbitrary packets on the
management network. However, preventing DoS is out of the scope of NACA
and can be addressed though other technical and administrative mechanisms.
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Figure 9: NACA testbed
5.2 Performance Evaluation
We evaluated NACA in a virtualized testbed, as illustrated in Figure 9. To limit
the influence of system configuration options on the results of the evaluation,
we chose a lightweight approach to isolation between the components. We used
Linux Containers [57] to isolate the address and memory spaces of the NACA
components. We deployed the modified ONOS controller, RequestTagger and
ReferenceMonitor in three separate containers: LXC A, LXC B, and LXC C
respectively. Note that this deployment choice is not binding and allows for
alternative isolation approaches. The testbed containers were deployed on a
Ubuntu 16.04 VirtualBox4 virtual machine, with 1 CPU and 8 GB memory,
default paravirtualization interface.
Figure 10: compileIntent, time in s.
To support backward compatibility and with reproducible results, we eval-
uated NACA using the intents and test case coverage available in ONOS. We
chose three parameters to test: intent compilation, intent submission and com-
bined intent compilation and submission. Figure 10 illustrates the performance
of intent compilation over 40 test runs. Here the NACA extensions induce a 9%
increase on the median intent compilation time (8% mean increase). The over-
head is caused by tagging the query request (see transition 1 - 2 in figure 8).
4Oracle VirtualBox https://www.virtualbox.org/wiki/VirtualBox
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We believe this overhead can be reduced if the Request Tagger is deployed
in an isolated execution environment (e.g. SGX enclaves [52]) rather than a
lightweight virtualization container. We leave this optimization to future work
and improved prototype implementations.
We next evaluated the performance of the entire intent installation chain.
Figure 11 illustrates the performance of intent installation over 40 test runs.
Intent installation includes the entire flow from request submission by the ap-
plication to the queries accepted by the NIB and includes the intent compilation
steps evaluated above. In this case, the mean performance overhead is up to
66% and reflects implementation and deployment decisions (including choice of
isolation mechanism and target deployment platform).
Figure 11: submitIntent, time in s.
Finally, Figure 12 illustrates an evaluation of a combined stress test where
intents are submitted and subsequetly withdrawn.
Figure 12: StressSubmitWithdraw, time in s.
Similar to intent compilation, we believe the performance of intent sub-
mission and intent withdrawal can be improved by implementing the reference
monitor in an isolated execution environment on the same host. This will re-
duce the communication overhead both between the network controller and the
reference monitor, and between the request tagger and the network controller.
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A similar strategy or decomposing elements in the data plane was sucessfully
demonstrated in [56], [58] Detailed statistics are listed in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of performance evaluation of NACA
Data Minimum Maximum Mean Median Stddev
compileIntent, s 0,154 0,287 0,192 0,1855 0,033
with NACA 0,16 0,298 0,207 0,203 0,0314
Overhead 7,89% 9,43%
submitIntent, s 0,268 0,488 0,323 0,306 0,057
with NACA 0,467 0,681 0,537 0,526 0,526
Overhead 66% 72%
stressSubmitWithdraw, s 0,250 0,396 0,302 0,297 0,032
with NACA 0,460 0,762 0,579 0,572 0,063
Overhead 72% 72%
We did not evaluate multi-application scalability in this context. This work
primarily focuses on exploring the principle of making high-level network con-
figuration and control commands (intents) traceable (through tagging) and en-
forceable (through access masks) throughout the evaluation and execution flow.
However, we intend to further extend this work and evaluate multi-application
scalability in an extended prototype of NACA.
6 Related Work
From the origins of SDN, access control and network programambility have
received significant attention.
Access control for SDN controllers Casado et al. describe in Ethane [59]
an enterprise network architecture allowing network managers to control deploy-
ments using system-wide fine-grained policies. Ethane includes two component
types: (1) ‘dumb’ switches maintaining flow table entries and communicating
with the controller, and (2) one or more controllers handling host registration
and authentication, tracking network bindings, implementing access control,
and enforcing resource limits on the managed flows. The proposed high-level
language for Ethane network management policies – despite its shortcomings
such as lack of support for dynamic policy updates and assumption of a fixed
network topology – has inspired a rich collection of subsequent network pol-
icy languages [60, 61, 62, 63]. While such network control languages fueled a
rapid development of network controller capabilities, they operate on a lower
abstraction level than required for network management applications. Several
outstanding issues of the Ethane model are broadcast and service discovery,
application-layer routing, knowledge about application-layer configuration and
potential damage from spoofing Ethernet addresses.
Ferguson et al. [7] rely on hierarchical composition of policies to define access
to actions performed on traffic flows, as well as to control resource allocation.
Furthermore, the framework contains a policy conflict resolution mechanism
based on user-defined operators. Conflict resolution is essential to enable a
distributed approach to policy definition, where distinct applications requiring
device resources and services define access policies and Quality-of-Service re-
quirements. While this approach brings control over network access to applica-
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tions using network services, it does not hide the details of device resources and
requires from the application knowledge of the network internals. NACA main-
tains the higher-level control of network access, while abstracting the network
internals from the application programmers.
The access control scheme for SDN controllers proposed in [5] accounts for
device resources, multiple security requirements, conflicts originating from re-
configuration of network components, and delegation of access permissions. This
scheme mimics access control schemes for operating systems, with contextual
adjustments. In this case network users are the subjects and the network com-
ponents are the objects. A follow-up prototype is described in [64].
APIs for Network Configuration The Pane controller [24] allows applica-
tions to control SDN deployments. It delegates read-write privileges on network
configuration to end-users or applications acting on their behalf. The Pane API
allows three messages types – requests, queries and hints. Requests affect the
state of the network following the intention of the application. Applications
can issue queries about the state of the network and provide hints to notify the
controller about upcoming changes, e.g. in the network resource usage. In this
model, principals are included in one or more shares and have complete access
control privileges – including recursive delegation of privileges – over the set of
network flows in the respective shares. Intra-share resource over-subscription
is allowed and is monitored by the controller, which also detects and resolves
potential conflicts. NACA takes a different approach by restricting applications
to network control privileges explicitly declared, verified and validated at de-
ployment time. Furthermore, it verifies that control messages issued by network
applications comply with the allowed control privileges.
A low-level API for dynamic configuration of Quality-of-Service resources in
network devices can be implemented through a plugin to the OVSDB proto-
col [65]. Such low-level configuration allows granular control across three levels:
port, switch and network-wide controls. While this allows extensive control
over the forwarding plane configuration, the proposed approach does not dis-
cuss mechanisms to prevent applications using such an API from monopolizing
network control, nor any resolution mechanism in case of conflicting policies.
A Network Overlay Framework [66] addresses the challenge of configuring
network deployments according to application requirements. Through its API
and programming language, the Network Overlay Framework allows developers
to program the network according to the needs of the application. This replaces
the “best-effort” packet delivery approach with explicit Quality-of-Service guar-
antees tailored to a specific application. While the approach has been imple-
mented for the Hadoop data processing framework, it does not consider any
multi-application or multi-tennant scenarios. Likewise, it does not describe any
resolution mechanism that would be needed in the case of configuration con-
flicts. Furthermore, this approach allows the forwarding plane to manipulate
the configuration of the control plane, disregarding the possibility of malicious
or misconfigured applications. This in turn creates network security and safety
concerns.
SDN controller functionality can be implemented by extending an existing
operating system and leveraging its software ecosystem, i.e. operating system
utilities and a distributed file system, as proposed in yanc [8]. Here, file I/O is
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used as a single API for SDN applications, allowing to avoid the restriction to
use programming languages mandated by the implementation of the SDN con-
troller. The authors indicate the possibility of using permissions implemented
by the virtual file system layer for fine-grained access control of network re-
sources. Yanc could leverage NACA by storing resource masks in the extended
file attributes and further integrating the NACA API with existing access control
policies.
Eden is a framework for enabling end-host network functions [67], assuming
a single-domain network deployment, where at least a subset of end-hosts can be
trusted, e.g. in datacenters. The design builds on the observation that a large
class of network functions feature three key requirements: data-plane compu-
tation, data-plane state, and operation on application semantics. It includes
a flexible scheme for application-level classification of network traffic based on
a custom language as well as a compiler and run-time for action functions –
constructs able to access and modify packet classes and endpoint enclaves. In
Eden, network applications are “first-class principals”, and can classify packets
based on application-internal semantics. The classification follows the packet
through the end host stack and is used to determine the rules to apply. A similar
approach has been used in NACA for access control. However, Eden assumes a
single-domain, controlled and trusted environment, and does not feature policy
conflict resolution or access control mechanisms.
An early concept of intent-based network abstractions has been introduced
in [68], allowing to specify networks as a policy governed service. Such intents
describe the functionality of the network – i.e. what connectivity a certain appli-
cation requires, connectivity between endpoints and policies associated with the
connectivity – while leaving out the specifics on how to implement the required
connectivity. This approach is further developed in projects such as “Boulder
North-bound Interface (NBI)” [6]. NACA reuses the NBI implementation in the
ONOS intent framework and extends the intent concept described in [68] with
an API to specify access control constraints on the intents.
Maple [69] enables developers to use programming languages such as Haskell
and Java to define network behaviors through centralized algorithms (algorith-
mic policies). The use of algorithmic policies hides the challenges of implement-
ing high-level policies into sets of rules on distributed individual switches.
In large distributed systems such as SDN deployments configuration updates
may lead to undefined network behavior and security vulnerabilities, if applied
incorrectly due to long latency, dropped packets or weak consistency. To address
this, event-driven consistent updates [63] preserve well-defined behaviors when
transitioning between configurations in response to events. The approach places
strong locality requirements towards configuration updates: it allows exclusively
configuration changes decidable with local (rather than remote) information in
a distributed system. NACA allows to control the locality access of network
applications to SDN resources (recall Extent and Placement resource masks in
Table 1), and can be extended to include other access types.
7 Limitations and Future Work
The NACA mechanisms is only a first step towards implementing usable and
scalable deployment and configuration mechanisms for software defined net-
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work deployment. As such, it must be further improved and refined to reach
wider adoption. Therefore, in future work we aim to extend and improve sev-
eral aspects of this contribution, as follows: first, improve the performance of
NACA; second, deployment of dedicated components may be seen as a draw-
back in certain contexts. Re-implementing the request tagger and reference
monitor as components of the network controller running in an isolated execu-
tion environment will help address this use case, as well as potentially improve
the performance of NACA. Third, integrate with other controller platforms, in
particular yanc [8] in order to adapt the NACA intent approach to existing op-
erating system access control mechanisms. Fourth, extend NACA with hints as
in [7] can improve the overall performance of the deployment. Finally, imple-
ment and evaluate the approach using alternative isolation solutions discussed
in §4.2, to generate new insights into trade-offs between security guarantees and
performance for network controllers.
8 Conclusion
Design and implementation of a controller-agnostic north-bound interface is the
current focus of SDN development. Such an interface will allow network oper-
ators to deploy multiple applications on their SDN infrastructure and unlock
rich network management functionality. However, the currently available north-
bound interfaces do not offer access control mechanisms to allow applications
to negotiate network resource access or operators to obtain a comprehensive
overview of the resource access of the installed applications. We have addressed
this by first introducing a taxonomy of resource access models for SDN infras-
tructure, along with a network access control API which allow applications to
commit at deployment time to a set of resource access requirements, which are
then enforced by discrete components on the network controller platform. We
described the design, implementation and performance evaluation of the pro-
posed solution.
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